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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Estate of Jack King and Bonnie King (collectively the "Kings") hereby adopt 
the statement of jurisdiction set forth in Dee Henshaw's ("Henshaw") Opening Brief. 
(Br. at v.)1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue for Review 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Henshaw's 
second Motion to Vacate: (1) where the motion to vacate was presented approximately 
twenty-two months after the order it sought to vacate; (2) where the motion to vacate was 
presented after the trial court had previously denied several post judgment motions 
challenging the order and the order had been affirmed on appeal; (3) where the trial court 
was prohibited from changing its prior order by the doctrine of law of the case; and (4) 
where the defendants had standing to move for a directed verdict. 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment is ordinarily 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 
2000 UT App 110, If 8, 2 P.3d 451. This issue was preserved in the trial court by 
Henshaw in his Motion to Vacate. (R. at 1259-1269.) 
1
 Citation conventions in this brief are as follows: "Br." refers to Henshaw's 
Opening Brief, "Add. Exh." refers to an exhibit in the Kings' Addendum, and "R." refers 
to the record on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representation from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions 
of the transcript. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case has infested the court system for nine years and involves a dispute 
between the Kings and Henshaw over the use and ownership of water. The parties 
disputed Henshaw's use and right to the water and Henshaw filed this action in July of 
2000 to quiet title to his alleged water rights. 
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II. Course of Proceedings 
After years of pre-trial litigation, Henshaw's case against the Kings was heard 
before a jury on April 17-20, 2006. At the close of Henshaw's evidence, the Kings 
moved for a directed verdict dismissing all of Henshaw's claims. The court granted the 
Kings' motion from the bench, and among other rulings, concluded that the evidence 
failed to show that Henshaw acquired any right, title, and/or interest of Raymond Watrous 
to Pine Creek water or any easement on the Kings' land. 
On May 15, 2006, the trial court entered an Order and Judgment on Motions for 
Directed Verdict which memorialized its ruling from the bench. That same day, Henshaw 
sent an objection to the proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict to the trial court. 
In response to the trial court's Order, Henshaw filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or 
amend the court's directed verdict and then a Rule 60(b) motion for relief. The trial court 
denied both motions and Henshaw then filed his first appeal to this Court. 
On November 23, 2007, this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court. 
This Court held that Henshaw's appeal of the directed verdict was not timely and that the 
trial court had correctly denied the motion to vacate. 
Henshaw then filed a new Motion to Vacate the directed verdict on February 4, 
2008, and, on July 18, 2008, the trial court denied the second Motion to Vacate because 
Henshaw had not filed the motion within a reasonable time. 
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III. Disposition in the Court Below 
On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
denying Henshaw's Motion to Vacate. The trial court ruled that a motion under Rule 
60(b)(4) must be filed within a reasonable time. The trial court found that Henshaw's 
Motion to Vacate, filed approximately twenty-two months after entry of the directed 
verdict, after decisions on other post-trial motions and following an appeal was "simply 
not timely because it was not filed within a reasonable time." (R. at 1393.) 
The trial court found further that Henshaw raised the issue of standing at trial, in 
his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed June 23, 2006, and in his December 2006 
appellate brief In light of Henshaw's repeated argument of the issue, the trial court held 
that delaying the Motion to Vacate based on standing until February 6, 2008, was 
unreasonable and that the motion "should be denied as untimely." (Id.) 
Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal on August 15, 2008, and this appeal followed. 
IV. Statement of Facts 
As a preliminary matter, the Kings object to Henshaw's Statement of Facts to the 
extent that it cites unsupported factual allegations set forth in documents such as 
Henshaw's Complaint (R. at 1-16), Amended Complaint (R. at 467-481)., Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 738-775), and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 780-821) as fact. The Kings 
contend that any reference to facts related to the Pine Creek water rights should be based 
4 
on evidence that was properly offered and received at trial. However, where Henshaw 
has not provided this Court with a copy of a complete trial transcript for the record, no 
facts related to the evidence presented at trial may be properly cited on appeal. See, 
Bevan v. J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983)(holding that in the absence of a 
transcript, the appellate court presumes the trial proceedings were proper and judgment 
was supported by the evidence.) 
A. Kings9 Motion for Directed Verdict 
1. This case was heard before a jury on April 17-20, 2006 in the Sixth District 
Court in and for Wayne County, State of Utah. (R. at 1068; Add. Exh. 2 at pg.l.) 
2. At the close of Henshaw's case, the Kings moved the court for a directed 
verdict dismissing all of Henshaw's claims. (Id.) 
3. The court ruled on the Kings' motion for directed verdict from the bench, 
granting it in part and denying it in part. (Id.) The court dismissed all of the claims 
asserted by Henshaw and the other plaintiffs in the Complaint and the Amended 
Complaint. The court allowed amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence, 
however, and allowed Henshaw to assert: (1) a quiet title claim that he owned water rights 
in Pine Creek; and (2) a claim that he had an easement for a pipeline across the Kings' 
land. (Id.) 
4. In its directed verdict, the court specifically found that: 
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and 
resolving all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show 
5 
that plaintiffs acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous 
to Pine Creek water or any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous 
to any easement on the land of the defendants and the court directs a verdict 
adjudging that plaintiffs acquired no right, title or interest of Raymond 
Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an easement. 
(R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2.1j 5 at pgs. 2-3.)2 
5. The Jury issued a verdict on April 20, 2006, which mirrored the court's 
directed verdict. The verdict stated that Henshaw had failed to establish that he was 
entitled to use water from Pine Creek or that he had an easement over the Kings' 
property. (R. at 1011-1012; Add. Exh. 1 at Ht 1,3.)3 
6. Following the trial, the court directed the Kings' counsel to draft a proposed 
Judgment and Order on the Motions for Directed Verdict which conformed to the court's 
directed verdict and the jury verdict. Pursuant to this directive, the Kings' counsel 
prepared and served the proposed Judgment and Order on Henshaw's counsel on May 4, 
2006. (R. at 1068-1074.) 
2
 As part of the trial court's direct verdict, the court dismissed all claims asserted 
by plaintiffs Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw. Accordingly, Dee Henshaw is the 
only remaining plaintiff and appellant in this appeal. 
3
 In Henshaw's Opening Brief, he states as fact that "the jury found that [the] 
Kings had in fact sold water rights to the Watrouses and that those rights were transferred 
to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Eenshaw and 
from Mrs. Henshaw to [Dee Henshaw].. ." (Br. at 5, 13 at % 24.) Henshaw cites the jury 
verdict in support of this contention. However, the Verdict contains no such conclusion 
and, in fact, expressly contradicts this contention. As set forth in the Verdict, the jury 
found that Henshaw had failed to establish that he was entitled to use water from Pine 
Creek. (R. at 1011-1012; Add. Exh. 1 atfff 1,3.) 
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7. Upon the expiration often days from the date the proposed Judgment and 
Order were submitted to Henshaw's counsel, the trial court's clerk presented the proposed 
Judgment and Order to the court for signature. Having received no objection to the 
drafts, the court executed the Order and Judgment on May 15, 2006. (R. at 1068-1074; R. 
atll28;Exh.2.) 
8. On May 18, 2006, the trial court received Henshaw's Objection to the 
Proposed Judgment and Order. The Objection was signed by Henshaw's counsel on May 
15, 2006. (R. at 1128; Add. Exh. 4 at pg. 4.) 
9. Upon receiving Henshaw's Objection, and unaware that the court had 
entered their Proposed Order and Judgment, the Kings filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order on Motion for Directed Verdict on 
May 22, 2006. (R. at 1091-1099.) 
B, May 15, 2006, Order On Motions for Directed Verdict 
10. On May 15, 2006, the trial court entered an Order on Motions for Directed 
Verdict (the "Order"). (R. at 1125-1130; Add. Exh. 4.) 
11. The court's Order conformed to the court's grant of directed verdict in 
favor of the Kings and ruled that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to 
Henshaw, failed to show that Henshaw acquired Raymond Watrous' Pine Creek water 
rights. (R. at 1069-1070; Add. Exh. 2 atpgs. 2-3.) 
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C. June 19, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order on Henshaw's 
Objection to Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order 
12. On June 19, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
Order in which it denied Henshaw's May 15, 2006, Objection to the Kings' proposed 
Order and Judgment. (R. at 1125-1130.) 
13. The court's Order noted that it had received Henshaw's Objection on May 
18, 2006, three days after it had entered the Proposed Order and Judgment, and that it 
therefore considered the Objection to be untimely. (R. at 1128.) 
14. However, the court also stated that notwithstanding Henshaw's Objection, 
the Kings' Proposed Order and Judgment accurately reflected the court's ruling on the 
Motions for Directed Verdict as well as the Verdict rendered by the jury and the court 
therefore overruled Henshaw's Objection. (R. at 1128.) 
D. Henshaw's Rule 59(e) Motion 
15. On June 23, 2006, thirty-nine days after the court entered its Order on 
Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment, Henshaw filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter 
or Amend the Court's Directed Verdict. (R. at 1131-1143.) In support of the motion to 
alter or amend, Henshaw argued that Kings lacked standing to assert that Henshaw had 
not acquired Raymond Watrous' rights. (R. at 1131-1141.) 
16. On September 13, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment denying Henshaw's Rule 59(e) motion on 
the grounds that it was untimely. (R. at 1171-1174.) 
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E. Henshaw's Rule 60flb) Motion 
17. On September 23, 2006, Henshaw filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) wherein he repeated his contention that the trial court erred in entering the 
Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment. (R. at 1175-1188.) 
18. On November 14, 2006, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion which denied the Motion. (R. at 1209-1214.) 
F. Henshaw's First Appeal 
19. On December 15, 2006, Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal in which he 
appealed the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict entered on May 15, 
2006, as well as the trial court's denial of his Rule 60(b) Motion entered on November 15, 
2006. (R. at 1215-1216; Add. Exh. 7.) In his appellate brief, Henshaw argued that the 
Kings lacked standing to bring the motion for directed verdict. 
20. On November 23, 2007, this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial 
court's decision, both as to the directed verdict and to the trial court's decision to deny the 
motion to vacate the directed verdict. This Court held that Henshaw's appeal of the 
directed verdict was not timely and that the trial court had not abused its discretion by 
denying the motion to vacate. (R. at 1235-1246; Add. Exh. 7.) 
G. Henshaw's Second Motion to Vacate 
21. On February 6, 2008, Henshaw filed a second motion to vacate. The 
motion challenged the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict dated May 15, 2006. (R. at 
9 
1259-1260; 1261-1270.) This was Henshaw's fourth post-judgment motion challenging 
the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict4 and followed Henshaw's unsuccessful appeal 
of the directed verdict and the order denying Henshaw's first motion to vacate. 
22. On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
denying Henshaw's second motion to vacate. (R. at 1391-1395; Add. Exh. 8.) 
23. The trial court ruled that a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within 
a reasonable time and found that Henshaw's motion to vacate, filed approximately 
twenty-two months after entry of the directed verdict, after decisions on other post-trial 
motions and following an appeal was "simply not timely because it was not filed within a 
reasonable time." (R. at 1393; Add. Exh. 8.) 
24. The trial court found further that Henshaw had raised the issue of standing 
at trial, in his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed June 23, 2006, and in his 
December 2006 appellate brief. In light of Henshaw's repeated argument of the issue, the 
trial court held that delaying the motion to vacate based on standing until February 6, 
2008, was unreasonable and that the motion "should be denied as untimely." (Id.) 
H. King's Rule 11 Motion 
25. On February 22, 2008, the Kings served a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 
Henshaw arguing that Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate was presented for an 
4
 The previous three motions were the May 18, 2006, Objection to the Proposed 
Judgment and Order; the June 23, 2006, Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Directed 
Verdict; and the September 23, 2006, Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
10 
improper purpose and asserted legal contentions that were not warranted by existing law. 
(R. at 1329-1331). The Kings filed the motion on March 20, 2008. (Id.) 
26. On October 23, 2008, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions denying the motion. (R. at 1452-1456.) The trial 
court's decision included this admonition to Henshaw's counsel, 
Nevertheless, counsel is strongly admonished and warned. In the 
Memorandum Decision and Order regarding [the second Motion to Vacate], 
this court held '[t]here can be no legitimate claim that standing is a new 
issue.' The standing issue was raised at trial, again on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment, and again on appeal. Vigorous advocacy is 
admirable, but unless there is truly a good faith basis for actions in 
litigation, such advocacy can cross the line and become discourteous, 
costly, time consuming, and even uncivil to both the opposing party and the 
court. 
Id 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Henshaw's second motion to vacate. The trial court properly denied Henshaw's second 
motion to vacate because it was not presented within a reasonable time. Henshaw filed 
the motion approximately twenty-two months after entry of the Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict and after challenging the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict in an 
objection to the proposed order, a motion to alter or amend the order, a motion to vacate 
the order and an appeal of the order to this Court. The trial court found that it was 
11 
unreasonable to delay raising the issue of the Kings' standing when Henshaw had raised 
the issue in previous motions and in the appeal. 
Furthermore, the trial court properly denied Henshaw's second motion to vacate 
where it was required to do so by the doctrine of law of the case. The trial court's prior 
rulings on the directed verdict, this Court's prior ruling on the directed verdict and finality 
of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict restrained the trial court from changing its 
ruling on the directed verdict. 
Moreover, the trial court properly denied Henshaw's second motion to vacate 
where the King had standing to move for a directed verdict. Henshaw had the burden of 
establishing he had good title to the water rights in question including the rights held by 
Raymond Watrous. He failed to produce any evidence that he had acquired those rights. 
Thus, a directed verdict was correct. The Kings would have suffered a distinct injury if 
Henshaw had prevailed on this issue and thus they had standing to defend against and to 
demonstrate to the court that Henshaw had failed to meet his burden. 
Finally, the Kings contend that they should be awarded their attorney fees incurred 
in defending against Henshaw's frivolous appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate because the 
motion was not timely, the motion was barred by the doctrine of law of the case and 
because the Kings had standing to move for a directed verdict. 
L THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HENSHAW'S SECOND 
MOTION TO VACATE WHERE THE MOTION WAS FILED 
TWENTY-TWO MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER HENSHAW 
SOUGHT TO VACATE WAS ISSUED 
Henshaw's second motion to vacate was time barred and therefore appropriately 
denied. A Rule 60(b) motion to vacate must be made within a reasonable time and, if 
based upon any of the first three reasons enumerated in the Rule, must be brought within 
three months after entry of the challenged order. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2009). The Utah 
Supreme Court has noted, "the Rules of Civil Procedure are so designed as to promote the 
finality of judgments by an expeditious resolution of any post-judgment motions." Zions 
First Natl Bank v. C est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980). Additionally, 
"[rjule 60(b) seeks to balance the importance of finality against the desirability of 
resolving disputes on the merits. . . . In keeping with the policy that 'there must be an end 
to litigation someday', the rule imposes a one-year limit5 on motions that invoke clauses 
(l)-(3). . . .[M]otions invoking clauses (4)-(6) must only be made within a reasonable 
5While the Federal Rule has a one-year limit, Utah Rule 60(b) imposes a 3-month 
limit. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
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time." Cotto v. U.S., 993 F.2d 274, 277-2786 (1st Cir. 1993) {quoting Ackerman v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950))(other citations omitted). 
Henshaw's motion argued that the directed verdict "is void as a matter of law." 
(R. 1261-1269.) Although he did not so specify, Henshaw was apparently requesting 
relief under Rule 60(b)(4) ("the judgment is void") and, thus, was required by the rule to 
make his motion within a reasonable time. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (2009). 
"What is a reasonable depends on the circumstances. Thus, a reasonable time for 
purposes of Rule 60(b)(6) many be more or less than the one year [three month] period 
established for filing motions under Rule 60(b)(l)-(3)." Cotto, 993 F.2d at 280. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of reasonableness under 
Rule 60(b) and held that a sixteen month delay is "overlong in virtually any event." Id. 
The court held that when the reason allegedly justifying Rule 60(b) relief was known 
within two months after entry of the challenged order, "there is no valid excuse for having 
dawdled an additional fourteen months before alerting the district court lo the changed 
circumstances. Such protracted delay scuttles any claim that plaintiffs' motion was 'made 
within a reasonable time.'" Id.; see also Planet Corp. v. Sullivan, 702 F.2d 123, 126 (7th 
6
"Utah courts may appropriately look to federal case law interpreting related 
federal rules for guidance in interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Natl 
Adver. Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App 75, 131 P.3d 872, 876 n.9 {citing, State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193. 
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Cir. 1983)(holding that six month delay in bringing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion was 
unreasonably dilatory.) 
In this case, Henshaw waited twenty-two months after the order granting the 
motion for directed verdict to bring his second motion to vacate. This is not a reasonable 
time. Kings raised the issue of title to Raymond Watrous's water rights early and often in 
the litigation. Kings first raised the issue in September 2000, just weeks after the 
commencement of the action, and raised the issue several times in response to or in 
support of pre-trial motions. 
Henshaw questioned Kings' standing at trial in response to the defendants' motion 
for directed verdict. Although the trial court did not make an express finding that "Kings 
have standing," it implicitly recognized the Kings' standing when it granted their motion 
for directed verdict. Henshaw again questioned Kings' standing in the June 2006 motion 
to alter or amend the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. The trial court denied the 
motion to alter or amend because it was not timely and, thus, did not expressly rule on the 
standing question. Other than the frivolous character of the argument, however, there is 
no reason why Henshaw could not have raised the question of standing in a Rule 60 
motion within three months of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. For example, 
Henshaw could have argued standing in the first motion to vacate (Henshaw's third post-
judgment motion) in September 2006. 
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After his unsuccessful Rule 59 motion, Henshaw then resurrected his standing 
argument in his appeal brief filed with this Court in April of 2007. Inexplicably, 
Henshaw waited until after this Court issued an opinion affirming the trial court's 
decision to argue standing in the current motion to vacate. 
Twenty-two months is a unreasonably long delay in almost any event. It is 
certainly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. For six years prior to the 
motion for directed verdict, Henshaw knew of the Kings' contention that Henshaw had 
the burden of proving title to Raymond Watrous's water rights. Henshaw concocted the 
notion that the Kings lacked standing to move for a directed verdict as soon as they 
moved for a directed verdict, yet Henshaw inexplicably waited twenty-two months and 
then repeated the argument of lack of standing in his second motion to vacate. There was 
no newly discovered evidence, there was no newly minted legal authority supporting 
Henshaw's argument, there was no change in circumstance, and there was no explanation 
of the twenty-two month delay. Henshaw made his standing argument at trial in response 
to the motion for directed verdict. If he disagreed with the trial court's decision, his 
remedy was a timely direct appeal which he failed to do. Simply put: Henshaw waited 
too long. 
.EL THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ON THE MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT IS NOT VOID 
The Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is not void. The order, including the 
portion of the order challenged by Henshaw, is valid. Even if Kings lacked standing (and 
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they clearly had standing), the jurisdictional defect would, at most, render the judgment 
voidable, not void. Utah cases hold that a void judgment may be challenged at any time 
and the "reasonable time" limitation of Rule 60(b) does not apply to void judgments. See, 
e.g. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1992). However, Utah cases also 
distinguish between void judgments and voidable judgments. Unlike void judgments, 
there are limits on when a judgment which is voidable can be attacked. 
It has long been the law that a judgment which is voidable cannot be attacked in a 
collateral proceeding. Intermillv. Nash, 75 P.2d 157 (Utah 1938). Although this 
limitation on attacking a voidable judgment is not measured in months or days, it is a time 
limitation that is measured by procedural events. 
The trial court denied Henshaw's latest motion to vacate because it was untimely. 
The court found that the motion to vacate "filed approximately 21 months after the entry 
of the directed verdict. . ." was not timely. (R. 1393; Add. Exh. 8.) The court also found 
that procedurally it was unreasonable to challenge the order "after decision on other post-
trial motions,.. . following an appeal" and after Henshaw has previously "argued the 
issue of standing at the time of t r i a l . . . , in a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment..., 
[and] in the plaintiffs' appellate brief." (Id.) 
In Intermill, The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
The courts, functioning to determine and settle property rights, upon 
which persons may rely and the security of society be built, should 
enjoy, in their formal pronouncements, every possible degree of 
conclusiveness. To permit their determinations to be lightly regarded 
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or easily evaded would render them nugatory, and be a source of 
litigation and friction rather than to put an end thereto. That a litigant 
may obtain relief against an erroneous or improper judgment, the law 
has provided for him methods by which he may seek relief 
therefrom, by appeals to the courts rendering it, or by review in an 
appellate tribunal; or for matters rendering it invalid, which do not 
appear in the record, or other proper circumstances, he may ask a 
court of equity to set aside or annul the judgment. If he does not test 
the soundness of the judgment by the methods law has provided for 
that purpose, he cannot question or assail the same for errors in the 
judgment, or the proceeding in which it was entered when in another 
proceeding it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him. A 
judgment, once entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, having 
the res and the parties duly brought before it as provided by law, 
imports verity, proves itself, and is invulnerable to attacks by any 
indirect assaults. It can only be questioned in the manner and the 
proceedings established by law. And since a judgment is established 
and proved by the record thereof, unless an inspection of that record 
establishes its invalidity, shows it to be void, the judgmenl is 
conclusive and may not be questioned collaterally by any matters 
dehors the record thereof. 
Id. at 160-161 (citations omitted). 
The Intermill court held that if "the court had jurisdiction of the res and of the 
parties" the judgment is conclusive even if there were jurisdictional errors. Id. at 162-
163. A state trial court has broad subject matter jurisdiction. "The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted by the Utah 
Constitution and the not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (2009). 
Henshaw's claims at trial were narrowed to two issues: (1) did he own water rights, and 
(2) did he own an easement? These claims are clearly within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of a district court. The parties were also within the jurisdiction of the court. 
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Because the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its order is 
valid. An error of the type alleged by Henshaw, even if present, would only render the 
order voidable, not void. 
The California Court of Appeals explained the issue this way: 
The term jurisdiction, used continuously in a variety of situations, 
has so many different meanings that no single statement can be 
entirely satisfactory as a definition. Essentially, jurisdictional errors 
are of two types. Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or 
strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine 
the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the 
parties. When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an 
ensuing judgment is void, and thus vulnerable to direct or collateral 
attack at any time. 
However, in ordinary usage the phrase lack of jurisdiction is not 
limited to these fundamental situations. It may also be applied to a 
case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter 
and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no "jurisdiction" (or 
power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds 
of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural 
prerequisites. When a statute authorizes a prescribed procedure, and 
the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has 
exceeded its jurisdiction. When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, 
but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely 
voidable. That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and 
a party may be precluded from setting it aside by principles of 
estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata. Errors which 
are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for 
example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are 
generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final 
unless 'unusual circumstances were present which prevented an 
earlier and more appropriate attack. 
County of Los Angeles v. Harco Nat, Ins, Co,, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 573, 577-578 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006)(citations and quotations omitted). 
19 
In Harco, the trial court entered summary judgment against the defendant. The 
defendant failed to timely appeal the judgment and subsequently alleged by motion that 
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering summary judgment. The court of 
appeals ruled, 
Contrary to [the defendant's] argument, Judge Silvers did not lack 
jurisdiction in the fundamental sense. She had a statutory basis for 
the exercise of judicial power, which [the defendant] invoked by 
filing the motion under section 1305.4. Again, if Judge Silvers 
erred, an improbable conclusion given the record, her ruling should 
have been challenged directly on appeal, rather than by way of 
collateral attack after the judgment was final. Had [the defendant] 
appealed in a timely fashion and if the voidable summary judgment 
had been set aside on appeal, it would be as if it was never entered. 
Id. 
Federal Courts interpreting the corollary Federal Rule 60(b)(4), have held that 
although the time limits stated in the rule do not apply to a challenge of a void judgment, 
not every erroneous exercise of jurisdiction renders the judgment of the court void. For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled: 
Rule 60(b) provides in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (4) the 
judgment is void." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) (2000). Rule 60(b)(4)... is not 
subject to any time limitation. 
A judgment is void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the rendering court 
was powerless to enter it. A judgment may in some instances be void 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, this occurs only 
where there is a plain usurpation of power, when a court wrongfully 
extends its jurisdiction beyond the scope of its authority. 
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A court does not usurp its power when it erroneously exercises 
jurisdiction. Since federal courts have jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction, that is, power to interpret the language of the 
jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue by the court, 
error in interpreting a statutory grant of jurisdiction is not equivalent 
to acting with total want of jurisdiction There must be no arguable 
basis on which the court could have rested a finding that it had 
jurisdiction. 
Gschwindv. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d 1342, 1345-1346 (10th Cir. 2000). See 
also, Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 2005)(holding that to preserve the 
finality of judgments and to prevent litigants from circumventing the appeal process, the 
concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed and will only be applied where the 
jurisdictional error is egregious.) 
Henshaw should have challenged the trial court's order directly on appeal if he 
thought there was an error. He did not file a timely direct appeal of the Order on Motions 
for Directed Verdict. Thus, that order "should enjoy . . . every possible degree of 
conclusiveness." Intermill, 75 P.2d at 160. Instead, Henshaw has been permitted to 
continue with seemingly endless litigation by concocting a meritless legal argument and 
labeling it a jurisdictional question. Accordingly, Henshaw is at best challenging a 
voidable order rather than a void one, and his inexcusable delay in this case is fatal to his 
motion. 
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III. HENSHAW'S SECOND MOTION TO VACATE WAS BARRED BY 
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henshaw's Second Motion to 
Vacate where the Motion was barred by the doctrine of law of the case. The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined this doctrine as follows: 
The "law of the case" is a legal doctrine under which a decision made on an 
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation. The doctrine was developed in the interest of economy and 
efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in 
the same case. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted). 
The doctrine of law of the case applies to several "distinct sets of problems, each 
with a separate analysis. Id. At least three iterations of the doctrine applied to bar 
Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate: (1) the "mandate rule;" (2) the "prior ruling rule;" 
and (3) the "final decision" rule. The Kings contend that each one of these doctrines 
taken collectively or independently support the trial court's denial of Henshaw's second 
Motion to Vacate. 
A. The Mandate Rule Bars Henshaw's Second Motion To Vacate 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the mandate rule, 
[Dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on a legal issue in a 
case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent 
proceedings of that case. The lower court must not depart from the 
mandate, and any change with respect to the legal issues governed by the 
mandate must be made by the appellate court that established it or by a 
court to which it, in turn, owes obedience. In addition, the lower court must 
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implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account 
the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces. The 
application of the mandate rule lacks the flexibility found in other branches 
of the law of the case doctrine This serves the dual purpose of 
protecting against the reargument of settled issues and of assuring 
adherence of lower courts to the decisions of higher courts. 
Id. at 1036 (citations omitted). 
A corollary to the mandate rule is that, 
[CJourts may give preclusive effect to a ruling that could have been 
appealed, but has been abandoned by a failure to do s o . . . . "[T]he 
whole point of the rule regarding abandonment of claims is to 
require that all viable arguments be vigorously pursued throughout 
the proceedings, thereby allowing for earlier decision, rather than 
permitting parties to pick and choose which claims will be presented 
on appeal and which will be held back until a later time." 
In re Dep't of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litigation, 821 F.Supp. 1432 (D. 
Kan. 1993) (quoting Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 
F.2d 320, 327 n.9 (D.C.Cir.1989)). 
The mandate rule is consistent with the principle that 
Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used to escape the consequences of failure 
to take a timely appeal. In our adversary system of justice, each 
litigant remains under an abiding duty to take the legal steps that are 
necessary to protect his or her own interests. Thus, Rule 60(b)(6) 
may not be used as a back-door substitute for an omitted appeal, and, 
in all but the most exceptional circumstances, a party's neglect to 
prosecute a timeous appeal will bar relief under the rule. 
Cotto, 993 F.2d at 278. 
Henshaw argued the question of standing in his first appeal. In response to 
Henshaw's first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's Order on Motions for 
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Directed verdict. Accordingly, this Court rendered its decision and the mandate rule 
prohibited the trial court from reconsidering its decision to grant the Kings' motion for 
directed verdict. 
Moreover, this Court did not expressly rule on the question of the Kings' standing 
even though Henshaw raised the issue in his brief. (Add. Exh. 7.) However, this Court 
did expressly rule that Henshaw's first Notice of Appeal was late and, thus, this Court did 
not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. 
(Id.) This Court also held that the trial court correctly denied Henshaw's first Motion to 
Vacate. (Id.) 
In ruling on Henshaw's second motion to vacate, the trial court was bound by this 
Court's first decision. Both the letter and the spirit of the appellate decision required the 
trial court to give preclusive effect to its own Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. By 
failing to timely appeal the trial court's order, Henshaw abandoned any claim that Kings 
lacked standing to move for a directed verdict. 
B. The Prior Ruling Rule Bars Henshaw's Second Motion To 
Vacate 
Even in the absence of an appellate court mandate, the law of the case required the 
trial court to respect its own prior ruling and deny the second Motion to Vacate. Under 
the "prior ruling" branch of law of the case, 
[A] court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters it resolved in a prior 
ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and consistency. The 
doctrine is not a limit on power but, "as applied to the effect of previous 
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orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case, 
merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what 
has been decided." Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 
739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 
605, 618-19 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391-92 & n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 
(1983). It rests on " 'good sense and the desire to protect both court and 
parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable 
diehards.'" In re Dep 't of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig, 821 
F.Supp. 1432, 1434 (D.Kan. 1993) (quoting Wright § 4478, at 790). The 
exceptional circumstances under which courts have reopened issues 
previously decided are narrowly defined: (1) when there has been an 
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has 
become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision 
was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. United States v. 
Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 862, 112 
S.Ct. 184, 116L.Ed.2d 145 (1991); see GzV/mor v. Wright, 850P.2d431, 
439 (Utah 1993) (Orme, Ct.App.J., concurring); Wright § 4478, at 790. 
Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1036. 
The trial court granted the Kings' motion for directed verdict despite Henshaw's 
argument at trial that Kings did not have standing to bring the motion. Thus, the trial 
court implicitly ruled that the Kings had standing. 
Henshaw presented no exceptional circumstances that would have justified the 
trial court granting the second motion to vacate and reopening the directed verdict. There 
had been no change of controlling authority. There was no new evidence which had 
become available which was not available at the time the motion for directed verdict was 
granted. The trial court's prior decision granting the motion for directed verdict was a 
correct decision. Both the trial court's express ruling that Henshaw had not acquired the 
rights of Raymond Watrous and the trial court's implied ruling that Kings had standing to 
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raise the issue were correct. The trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous and will 
not work a manifest injustice. 
Henshaw and his counsel could fairly be labeled "indefatigable diehards" who 
have burdened the court and the parties with repeated reargument. Neither the trial court 
nor this Court can countenance their belligerent tactics by considering Henshaw's second 
motion to vacate filed after several post-judgment motions and an unsuccessful appeal. 
It would not have been just for the trial court to re-open the directed verdict. 
Henshaw and his co-plaintiffs produced no evidence that they had acquired Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights at issue in the case. Because the issue was decided 
on directed verdict, the Kings introduced no evidence on the issue during their case in 
chief. The issue was not argued to the jury or submitted to the jury for decision. The jury 
did consider whether Henshaw had acquired the water rights allegedly owned by Mildred 
Watrous (Raymond's co-tenant) and held Henshaw had no right to use the waters of Pine 
Creek. Since the verdict, Jack King, one of the defendants, died. 
The Court cannot now re-open the trial, allow additional evidence and argument 
and submit the issue to a different jury merely on Henshaw's faint hope that a different 
jury would render a different verdict. 
C. The Final Decision Rule Bars Henshaw's Second Motion To 
Vacate 
The third branch of law of the case applicable to the second Motion to Vacate is 
the "final decision" rule. The law of the case doctrine provides that "when a legal 
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decision is made on an issue during one stage of a case, that decision is binding in 
successive stages of the same litigation." Jensen v. IHCHosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, f^ 67, 
82 P.3d 1076 (citations and quotations omitted). An exception to the law of the case 
doctrine allows a judge to fix mistakes and reconsider prior rulings in the same case 
before a final decision has been entered. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 
1310-11 (Utah Ct. App.l994)(emphasis added). The exception is inapplicable if a final 
decision has already been entered. See, e.g. Vessey v. State, 2005 WL 3498367 (Utah Ct. 
App.)7 The trial court could not revisit its decision to grant defendants' motion for 
directed verdict because the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict was a final order. 
"For an order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all parties 
and finally dispose of the subject matter of the litigation or the merits of the case. In 
other words, a judgment is final if it ends the controversy between the parties litigant." 
Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649, 651 (Utah 2000). The Order on Motions 
for Directed Verdict, dated May 15, 2006, was a final order because, together with the 
Judgment entered the same day, it disposed of the case as to all parties and all claims. 
Together, the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment were the final 
disposition of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case. They ended 
the controversy between the parties. 
7
 A copy of this unpublished decision is found in the Kings' Appendix as Exhibit 
9. 
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Because the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict was a final decision, the trial 
court no longer had the power to reconsider or change its decision when Henshaw filed 
his second Motion to Vacate.8 
IV. THE KINGS HAD STANDING TO PETITION THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
On appeal, and below, Henshaw has argued that the Kings lacked standing to 
move for a directed verdict. Henshaw is mistaken. Standing is a requirement applicable 
to plaintiffs, not defendants. Henshaw's argument to the contrary is, at best, incorrect. 
More accurately, the argument is frivolous and wholly without merit. 
As plaintiff in a quiet title action, Henshaw had the burden of proving that he held 
title to the disputed water rights. The Utaih Supreme Court framed the rule as follows: 
An action to quiet title to water rights is in the nature of an action to quiet 
title to real estate. To succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a 
plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the 
weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title. Likewise, in an 
action to quiet title to water rights, a plaintiff must succeed on the strength 
of his own title, not on the weakness of defendant's. 
8
 The fact that Henshaw couches his standing argument as a question of 
jurisdiction does change the result. Although "lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the 
court or either party at any time", A. J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 
325 (Utah 1991), "the issue of jurisdiction must reach finality the same as any other 
issue." Dairy Distrib., Inc. v. W. Conference of Teamsters, 294 F.2d 348, 351 (10th Cir. 
1961). Thus, although Henshaw could and did raise the question of standing and 
jurisdiction at trial and in his first appeal, the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction by 
adjudicating the question of Raymond Watrous' water rights became a final decision that 
could not be questioned at the time of the second motion to vacate. 
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Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 
1983)(citations omitted.) 
Thus, Henshaw could not prevail on the claim that he owned the disputed water 
rights unless he proved that he held title to the water rights. As plaintiff, Henshaw had 
the burden of proving that he held title to the water rights allegedly previously owned by 
Raymond Watrous. Henshaw's burden was to "prove the strength of his own title". See, 
Church, 659 P.2d at 1048-49. Title to the disputed water rights was part of the 
Henshaw's prima facie case. 
The status of Raymond Watrous' water rights was not a "claim" asserted by the 
Kings or even an affirmative defense, because the issue did not raise matters outside of 
Henshaw's prima facie case. See, e.g., Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 933 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996). If a plaintiff fails to prove an element of his prima 
facie case, as happened here, or if the defendants successfully negate an element of the 
prima facie case, the plaintiffs claim must be dismissed. 
In this case, Henshaw's argument that defendants lack standing is misplaced and 
inaccurate. Henshaw's argument is misplaced because title to Raymond Watrous' water 
rights was part of the plaintiffs' case. Whether defendants had standing or not, Henshaw 
was required to prove that he held title to the water rights. Henshaw failed to prove that 
he had acquired Raymond Watrous' rights and the trial court properly directed a verdict 
that he had not acquired those rights. 
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Henshaw's argument is inaccurate because defendants had standing. Defendants 
Jack and Bonnie King had standing because they "ha[d] or would suffer a distinct and 
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the case . . . " See, 
Washington City Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125. 
Notably, it was Henshaw that sued the Kings, not the other way around. Had Henshaw 
succeeded in proving his claims, including his claim for damages in excess of 10 million 
dollars, the Kings would have suffered a distinct and palpable injury. 
There were three basic ways for the Kings to avoid that potential injury. First, they 
could successfully controvert or negate Henshaw's claims and evidence. Second, they 
could assert counterclaims or affirmative defenses which offset Henshaw's claims. Third, 
as happened with the claim that Henshaw owned Raymond Watrous' water rights, the 
Kings could avoid injury by demonstrating to the court that Henshaw failed to produce 
evidence supporting his claim. Henshaw clearly failed to provide any evidence to the trial 
court to support his claim and Henshaw has also failed to provide this Court with a 
complete record in order to substantiate his claim or show evidence that would support 
his claim. 
A. This Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's Directed Verdict 
Where Henshaw Has Failed To Provide This Court With A 
Complete Record On Appeal 
Henshaw's contention that the Kings lacked standing to move for a directed 
verdict is an unsupported, unilateral allegation which this Court cannot resolve. When an 
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appellant challenges a trial court's ruling on a directed verdict, "the appellant is obligated 
to first 'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' Neely v. 
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, ^  11, 51 P.3d 724. To facilitate this marshaling requirement, 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[i]f the appellant 
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion." Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (2009). 
This Court has held that when an appellant fails to provide it with a transcript of 
the proceedings, it is unable to review the evidence and, therefore, "[it] can only presume 
that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence." Horton v. Gem State Mut. of 
Utah, 749 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citation omitted). 
In Horton, the trial court found that the appellant had breached the terms of an 
insurance contract. Id. at 848. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's findings 
and noted that the appellant had the burden of not only providing this Court with an 
adequate record to preserve its arguments for review but also to marshal all of the 
evidence that supported the trial court's findings. Id. at 849. This Court stated that 
"because the appellant failed to provide us with a transcript of the proceedings, we are 
unable to review the evidence and, thus, are unable to ascertain whether the trial court's 
findings were based upon sufficient evidence." Id. This Court ruled that "[a]bsent the 
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trial transcript, appellant's claim of error is 'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation 
which we cannot resolve.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
In Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, \ 16, 17 P.3d 1110, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "[a]s an appellate court, our 'power of review is strictly limited to the 
record presented on appeal.'" The Supreme Court noted that where the record in that case 
contained only partial transcripts, it was without an adequate record and therefore "must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below." Id. 
As in Horton and Gorostieta, Henshaw has failed to provide this Court with a 
complete record that includes a complete transcript of the trial. On January 9, 2009, 
Henshaw filed a partial transcript from the trial. This partial transcript includes only the 
examination of one witness and the arguments on Kings' motion for directed verdict. It 
omits the remainder of the proceedings at trial. Henshaw does not reference or cite the 
transcript in his opening brief even though the brief includes an extensive recitation of 
purported factual events. (Br. at 1-3; 9-11.) The Kings contend that the record is 
inadequate in this case and that this Court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings 
below." Gorostieta, 2000 UT 99, f 16. 
As this Court stated in Horton, "[a]bsent the trial transcript, appellant's claim of 
error is 'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve.'" Horton, 
794 P.2d at 849. In this case, absent a full transcript of the trial, Henshaw's challenge to 
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the trial court's directed verdict is unsupported and incapable of being resolved on appeal 
for lack of a sufficient record. 
Moreover, even if Henshaw had provided this Court with a trial transcript, he 
would fail to meet his marshaling requirement where there would be no evidence in the 
transcript which would refute or call into question the trial court's directed verdict. 
Henshaw has asserted that he could not marshal any facts because the trial court's Order 
on Motions for Directed Verdict did not contain express "findings of fact." (Br. at 11-
12.) This assertion is mistaken on two grounds. First, the Kings contend that the trial 
court's findings are themselves findings of fact. The fact there is no heading that reads 
"findings of fact" does not mean the court's directed verdicts were not findings of fact. 
Second, the court's Order clearly refers to the findings it made from the bench. (R. at 
1068; Add. Exh. 2 at pg. 1.) As the Order states, the trial court made oral findings of fact 
from the bench in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52. The fact that these 
findings were made orally, only underscores the necessity of a transcript of the trial for 
purposes of completing the record on appeal in accordance with Rule 11(e)(2). 
V. THE KINGS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES WHERE HENSHAW'S PRESENT APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
The Kings are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure where Henshaw's appeal is frivolous. Rule 33 defines a 
"frivolous" appeal as one that is "not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. 
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App. P. 33(b). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that a party's case is not frivolous 
where the "brief as a whole is supported by the record and the [party] makes good faith 
arguments that are adequately supported by case law, as opposed to a case in which the 
record [is] devoid of admissible evidence." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, % 
19, 104 P.3d 1208. 
In this case, Henshaw's appeal is frivolous as defined by both Rule 33 and the 
Utah Supreme Court. As set forth above, Henshaw's appeal is unsupported by the record 
where Henshaw failed to provide this Court with a complete transcript of the April jury 
trial as part of the record. 
Henshaw's brief is replete with unsupported factual allegations such as the 
contentions listed in paragraphs 1-11 of the Appellant's Statement of Facts, none of 
which are supported by reference to trial testimony or exhibits. (Br. at 9-11). 
Furthermore, Henshaw asserts that "the jury had found that Kings had in fact sold water 
rights to the Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw . . . " 
when there is no such finding in the Verdict or the Judgment. (R. at 1011-1012; R. at 
1073-1074). The jury's verdict and judgment actually contradict Henshaiw's assertion. 
The judgment states that "plaintiff Dee Henshaw is not entitled to use waiter from Pine 
Creek." (R. at 1074). 
Henshaw asserts that Raymond Waitrous died and that his interest in the disputed 
water rights passed to Mildred Watrous. (R. at 19-20, 23-26.) The unproven assertion 
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that Raymond Watrous died is essential to Henshaw's claim that he now owns the 
disputed water rights and his argument that Kings are not "interested persons" under the 
law. Yet Henshaw's brief includes no citation to evidence that Raymond Watrous died. 
Henshaw's appeal is frivolous not only because of the utter lack of evidentiary 
support. It is also frivolous because it lacks a good faith basis in law. Henshaw's 
argument that the Kings, as defendants, lacked standing to defend against Henshaw's 
claims or to negate elements of Henshaw's prima facie case is frivolous. Henshaw's 
repeated assertion of the frivolous standing argument despite being overruled by the trial 
court at least three time and by this court once, is in bad faith and designed to harass the 
Kings or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation for the Kings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Kings ask this Court to affirm the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Henshaw's second Motion to Vacate. 
Additionally, the Kings contend that they should be awarded their attorney fees where 
Henshaw's appeal is frivolous. 
DATED this /?* day of July, 2009. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
4 ^~ 
David R. W\Jiams i_3— 3 
Anthony M. Grover 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A April 20, 2006, Jury Verdict (R. at 1011-1012.) 
Exhibit B May 15, 2006, Order on Motions for Directed Verdict (R. at 1068-1072.) 
Exhibit C May 15, 2006, Judgment (R. at 1073-1074.) 
Exhibit D June 19, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order (R. at 1125-1130.) 
Exhibit E September 13,2006, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment (R. at 1171 -1174.) 
Exhibit F November 14, 2006, Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for 
Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP (R. at 1209-1214.) 
Exhibit G November 23, 2007, Utah Court of Appeals Decision: Hemhaw v. Estate of 
King, 2007 UT App 378, 173 P.3d 876 (R. 1235-1246.) 
Exhibit H July 18, 2008, Memorandum Decision and Order denying Henshaw's 
Motion to Vacate (R. 1391-1396.) 
Exhibit I Vessey v. State, 2005 WL 3498367 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
RECEIVED 
APR 2 0 2006 
OTHDIl 
C l£RK_ 
COURT 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE COUNTY 
18 South Main, Box 189 Loa, UT 84747 
Telephone: 435-836-1301 Fax: 435-836-2479 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW, 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK KING and BONNIE KING, 
Defendants. 
i 
VERDICT 
Case No. 000600007 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
Has the Plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence established that he is entitled to use 
water from Pine Creek? 
Yes • No 
If you answered "Yes," then how much water is the Plaintiff entitled to use? 
• 3 hours of water being the entire Pine Creek water every 18 days; 
• gallons per day. 
Has the plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence, established that he has an easement 
to connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six (6) inch waterline located on the 
defendant's property? 
Yes • No ft 
VERDICT, Case number 000600007, Page -2-
If you answered "No" to 1 and 3 above, then skip to the section dealing with Defendant's 
claims. 
5. If you answered "Yes" to both 1 and 3 above, has the Plaintiff established, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he was damaged when the defendants prevented him 
from taking water through the three (3) inch waterline? 
Yes • No D 
6. If you answered "Yes," to 5, how much money will fairly compensate Plaintiff for the 
damages sustained? 
$ 
WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS 
7. If you answered "No" to 1, above, then do you find that title to the Pine Creek water 
should be quieted in the Defendants? 
Yes • No m 
' / s Dated this 4 D _ day of April, 2006. _ _ ^ . . 
Jury Foreperson 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Russell S. Walker, #3363 
David R. Williams, #6686 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK KING and BONNIE KING 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 000600007 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on April 17, 18, 19 and 20, 2006. 
Plaintiffs Dee Henshaw, Dana Henshaw and Barbara Henshaw were represented by Charles A. 
Schultz. Defendants Jack and Bonnie King were represented by David R. Williams of Woodbury 
&Kesler,P.C. 
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict dismissing 
all of plaintiffs' claims and granting defendants' counterclaim to quiet title to Pine Creek water. 
The court decided to grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part for the reasons stated 
from the bench. 
1 
RECEIVED 
MAY i 5 ?006 
) I S
^ 6TH DISTpipyCOURT 
CLERK. 
IT IS ORDERED 
1. Plaintiffs' claim for tortuous interference or interference with economic relations 
is dismissed with prejudice based on the stipulation of the parties. 
2. Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed with 
prejudice based on the stipulation of the parties. 
3. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving 
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that the 
defendants converted property of the plaintiffs and the court directs a verdict of no 
cause of action on plaintiffs' claim for theft or conversion. 
4. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving 
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs 
Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw are entitled to recover on any claim against 
the defendants and the court directs a verdict of no cause of action on all of 
Barbara Henshaw's claims and a verdict of no cause of action on all Dana 
Henshaw's claims 
5. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and resolving 
all controverted facts in their favor, the evidence failed to show that plaintiffs 
acquired any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water 
or any right, title and/or interest of Raymond Watrous to any easement on the land 
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of the defendants and the court directs a verdict adjudging that plaintiffs acquired 
no right, title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek water or to an 
easement. 
6. The court grants plaintiffs' motion to amend claims to conform to the evidence 
and, therefore, dismisses plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract and claim for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with prejudice. Plaintiff Dee 
Henshaw may present to the jury a claim that he is entitled to use water from Pine 
Creek, a claim that he has an easement to connect a three(3) inch waterline to the 
six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' property and claim that he was damaged 
when the defendants prevented him from taking water through the six (6) inch 
waterline. 
7. Defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the claim that plaintiff is entitled to 
use water from Pine Creek, the claim that plaintiff has an easement to connect a 
three (3) inch waterline to the six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' property, 
the claim that plaintiff was damaged when the defendants prevented him from 
taking water through the six(6) inch waterline and on defendants' claim to quiet 
title to Pine Creek water against the claims of plaintiffs and their successors in 
interest is denied. 
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At the close of defendants' evidence, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff 
Dee Henshaw's claim that he is entitled to use water from Pine Creek, the claim that he has an 
easement to connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six(6) inch waterline on the defendants' 
property, and on defendants' claim to quiet title to Pine Creek water against the claims of 
plaintiffs and their successors in interest. The court decided to deny the motion for the reasons 
stated from the bench. 
IT IS ORDERED 
8. Plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict on plaintiff Dee Henshaw's claim that he 
is entitled to use water from Pine Creek, the claim that he has an easement to 
connect a three (3) inch waterline to the six (6) inch waterline on the defendants' 
property, and on defendants' claim to quiet title to Pine Creek water against the 
claims of plaintiffs and their successors in interest is denied. 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the forgoing ORDER ON 
MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT to the following by first class U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid on this -o day of May, 2006: 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 South 
BrighamCity, UT 84302 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
Russell S. Walker, #3363 
David R. Williams, #6686 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3358 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK KING and BONNIE KING 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000600007 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
This matter came before the Court for a jury trial on April 17, 18, 19 and 20, 2006. 
Plaintiffs Dee Henshaw, Dana Henshaw and Barbara Henshaw were represented by Charles A. 
Schultz. Defendants Jack and Bonnie King were represented by David R. Williams of Woodbury 
& Kesler. Having heard the evidence and being fully advised, the jury entered a verdict and 
based on that verdict, the Court orders, adjudges and decrees as follows: 
RECEIVED 
COURT 6THDI! CLERK 
1 
WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
1. Plaintiff Dee Henshaw is not entitled to use water from Pine Creek. 
2. Plaintiff Dee Henshaw does not have an easement to connect a three (3) inch 
waterline to the six (6) inch waterline located on the defendants' property. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS 
3. Title to Pine Creek water should not be quieted in the defendants. 
DATED this / 5 % a y of May, 2006. 
BYTI 
Judge Wallace 
District Court Judged 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that I did deliver a true and correct copy of the forgoing JUDGMENT to 
the following by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid on this ^ ^ day of May, 2006: 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 South 
BrighamCity, UT 84302 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
RECEIVED 
JUN 1 9 2006 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE COUNTY 
Wayne County Courthouse 
Loa, Utah 84747 
Telephone: (435) 836-1301 Facsimile: (435) 836-2479 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW, 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK KING and BONNIE KING, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 000600007 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
This case is before the Court for decision on the defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. In addition, this Memorandum Decision will address the plaintiffs 
Objection to the Proposed Judgment and Proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
This case was tried to a jury on 17-20 April, 2006. At the conclusion of the trial, the Jury 
rendered a verdict which found the defendants had failed to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that title to Pine Creek water should be quieted in them. Thereafter, the defendants filed 
a timely Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
Analysis of a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict requires the Court to 
"look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, granting the j.n.o.v. motion only if this examination demonstrates that there is insufficient 
HENSHAW v. KING, Case No. 000600007 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
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evidence to uphold the verdict." Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, P6 (Utah 1999); see also 
Eddy v. Albertson 's, Inc., 34 P.3d 781, 783 (Utah 2001); Collins v. Wilson, 984 P.2d 960, 964 
(Utah 1999). 
In this case, the evidence established that in consideration of payment in the amount of 
$1,500.00, the defendants executed a water deed to Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Watrous with the 
intent of conveying water to the Watrouses for use on property owned by the Watrouses. Later, 
the Watrouses sold their property to the plaintiff. However, neither the Watrouses nor the 
plaintiff ever perfected a water right based on the water deed by filing an application for a change 
in the point of diversion with the Utah State Engineer. 
In addition, extensive evidence established a clear course of conduct between the 
defendants, the Watrouses, and the plaintiff, in which the defendants acquiesced in use of Pine 
Creek water by the Watrouses and the plaintiff, on the plaintiffs property. Such use continued 
each year for a period in excess of twenty (20) years, because the defendants, and everyone else 
concerned, believed the defendants had sold the water by virtue of the water deed to Mr. and 
Mrs. Watrous. 
Finally, during the trial, Kirk Forbush, Regional Engineer, testified that because neither 
the Watrouses nor the plaintiff perfected the water conveyed by the water deed, the plaintiff 
acquired no right recognized or documented in records of the office of the State Engineer. 
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However, Mr. Forbush also testified that failure to perfect the water acquired under the water 
deed did not invalidate the water deed or the sale of the water to Mr. and Mrs. Watrous. 
From all the evidence presented at the trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party, it was reasonable for the Jury to conclude that the plaintiff acquired no 
recognizable right to use Pine Creek water because of failure to perfect the water acquired from 
the defendants in the water deed. 
However, it was also reasonable for the Jury to conclude that because the defendants 
freely admit they sold Pine Creek water to the Watrouses, and because thereafter, they acquiesced 
in use of Pine Creek water by the Watrouses and the plaintiff (as successor in interest to Mr. and 
Mrs. Watrous) for a period in excess of twenty (20) years, the defendants should not now be able 
to disavow that sale and to retake water they admittedly sold simply because the Watrouses failed 
to take the steps necessary to perfect their right to divert and use the water. The fact that the 
Jury's verdict leaves the issue somewhat unsettled does not undermine the credibility of the 
verdict. 
On this basis, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds 
sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict of the Jury. The defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied. 
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PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND PROPOSED ORDER 
Following the trial, the Court directed counsel for the defendants to draft a proposed 
Judgment based on the Jury's verdict and a proposed Order, regarding the Court's ruling on the 
parties' respective Motions for Directed Verdict. Counsel for the defendants complied with the 
Court's directive, and circulated a proposed Judgment and Order to counsel for the plaintiff for 
approval on or about 4 May 2006. 
At the conclusion often (10) days from the date the drafts were submitted to counsel for 
the plaintiff, the Clerk presented the proposed Judgment and Order to the Court for signature. 
Having received no objection to the drafts, the Court executed the Judgment and Order on 15 
May 2006. 
On 18 May 2006, the Clerk of the Court received the plaintiffs Objection to the proposed 
Judgment and Order. The Objection was signed by counsel for the plaintiffs on 15 May 2006. 
On this basis, the Court finds the plaintiffs Objections are not timely. Nevertheless, the 
Court also finds the Judgment and Order prepared by counsel for the defendant to accurately 
reflect the Court's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as well as the Verdict rendered by 
the Jury in this case. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs objection to both documents is overruled. 
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DATED this J£SL day of r\lMAC 
:
-/" 
WALLACE A. LI 
ff WAV.--',•'•' •'•! i">^** -* '4 
T/3i£fe-a:— / 
^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On JuK?e [c\ , 200_L a copy of the above document was sent to the following by the 
method indicated: 
Addressee Method 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
David R. Williams 
Reid W. Lambert 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358 
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• 
• 
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• 
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Mail 
Hand delivery 
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Hand delivery 
Fax 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
RECEIVED 
SEP 1 3 2006 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE COUNTY 
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747 
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW, 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK KING and BONNIE KING, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000600007 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
On 27 June 2006, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The 
Motion is accompanied by a Memorandum. Neither the plaintiffs' Motion nor their 
Memorandum refers to any rule as the basis for the Motion. Therefore, the Court construes the 
plaintiffs' Motion as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 59(e). 
Despite the title of their Motion, the plaintiffs' argument appears to center around the 
Court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict rather than the Judgment itself. However, the 
Court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is a judgment of the Court under the definition of 
"judgment" contained in Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it is an order from 
which an appeal lies. 
Under Rule 59(e), "a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 
6THDisraiqr COURT 
CLERK. 
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10 days after entry of the judgment." Both the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the 
Judgment were entered in this case on 15 May 2006. The plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Judgment is untimely under Rule 59(e) because it was served more than a month after the 
entry of the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment. 
In their memorandum in support of the motion, the plaintiffs explain that they failed to 
file their motion on time because they did not receive a copy of the executed Order1. The Court 
cannot independently determine whether this is correct because the file does not contain any 
certificate of service indicating the plaintiffs were ever sent a copy of the executed Order. The 
plaintiffs argue that it was the defendants' responsibility to serve a copy of the executed Order 
on the plaintiffs. 
Regardless, the language of Rule 59(e) is clear that a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment must be filed within ten (10) days after entry of the judgment, as opposed to notice of 
entry of the judgment. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion is untimely and should not be 
considered by the Court. The Motion is denied. 
By their own assertion, the plaintiffs learned about the execution of the Order from this Court's decision 
on 19 June 2006. 
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DATED this *5% day of * W W i U * ^ , mM ^ 
WALLACE A. LEE, Jfl&£ CO"JRYS -X/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On 
method indicated: 
// / o 200b , a copy of the above document was sent to the following by the 
Addressee Method 
* 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
David R. Williams 
Russell S. Walker 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
RECEIVED 
NOV 1 5 2006 
6TH DISjraQT COURT 
CLERK ~TN — 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE COUNTY 
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747 
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW, 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JACK KING and BONNIE KING, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) URCP 
Case No. 000600007 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The defendants responded; and the plaintiffs replied. The motion is now submitted 
for a decision. 
The plaintiffs seek to vacate the directed verdict entered by the Court on 15 May 2006. 
The plaintiffs raise the following grounds for requested relief: (1) the Court erred in entering the 
directed verdict prematurely without considering the plaintiffs' objections in violation of Rule 
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the defendants failed to notify the plaintiffs that 
the directed verdict had been signed by the Court as required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 58A(d). 
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Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court has authority and discretion to relieve a party from a final 
judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The Court 
considers whether the grounds advanced by the plaintiffs are sufficient to justify such relief. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Alleged Violation of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
This Court previously considered the plaintiffs' objections to the proposed Order 
regarding the parties' Motions for Directed Verdict in its Memorandum Decision and Order 
dated 19 June 2006. In that Decision and Order, this Court did find the plaintiffs' objections 
were not timely, but, notwithstanding the untimeliness of the objections, the Court still 
considered the objections and specifically found "the Judgment and Order prepared by counsel 
for the defendant to accurately reflect the Court's ruling on the Motions for Directed Verdict, as 
well as the Verdict rendered by the Jury in this case." On this basis, the plaintiffs' objections 
were overruled. 
Regardless, the Court finds that by its terms, Rule 7(f)(2) is binding only upon counsel 
and not upon the trial court. See Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 
682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984). 
In Tolboe, the Supreme Court analyzed Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the United 
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States District Court for the District of Utah1, which, at the time, provided that the notice of 
objections to the proposed order '"shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after the service of proposed order on the opposing counsel." 
The plaintiff in that case argued that Rule 2.9 was violated because the court had signed 
the proposed order a day after it was served upon the opposing counsel. Id. at 848. Thus, the 
plaintiff maintained it was denied an opportunity to object, and moved the court to vacate the 
order. Id. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs argument was without merit because Rule 
2.9 was binding only upon counsel and not upon the trial court. Id. at 849. 
The requirement of Rule 7(f)(2)2 is similar to the requirement of Rule 2.9 described 
above. Therefore, similar analysis applies. 
The Court declines to vacate the Order regarding the Directed Verdict on this ground. 
2. Alleged Violation of Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The plaintiffs' request to vacate the directed verdict on this ground should also be denied. 
1
 Today the requirements of this rule are in Rule 54-1(b) of the Rules of Practice of the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless 
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon 
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be 
filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served 
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
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The plaintiffs claim they did not receive proper notice of entry of the judgment from the 
defendants as required by Rule 58A(d). Generally, to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) for 
lack of notice about a judgment, a moving party must demonstrate "diligence in trying to 
determine whether judgment had been entered" or that the moving party was 'actually misled . . . 
whether there had been entry of judgment." Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d 
1008, 1010-11 (Utah App. 2003). See also Hawley v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2005 UT App 
368. 
In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to learn about 
entry of the judgment. Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs were not diligent enough 
in trying to determine whether the judgment had been entered. 
Similarly, the only evidence the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they were 
misled to believe that the judgment had not been entered in this case is the plaintiffs' statement 
that the defendants responded to their objections to the proposed order instead of notifying them 
about entry of the order and judgment. 
The case file shows that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judgment 
were signed and entered by the Court on 15 May 2006. The plaintiffs signed their Objections to 
the proposed order and judgment on 15 May 2006, and they were received by the Court on 18 
May 2006. The defendants5 Reply to the plaintiffs' Objections was signed on 19 May 2006; and 
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stamped by the clerk on 22 May 2006. 
Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants' counsel knew 
about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and mailed the Reply. The plaintiffs 
have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel for the defendants had actual 
knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed to notify the plaintiffs about it. 
Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to produce facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that they were diligent in trying to learn about entry of the judgment or that they 
were actually misled to believe that no judgment had been entered. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs' request for Rule 60(b) relief on this ground is also denied. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The plaintiffs' Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 60(b) URCP is denied. 
DATED this /fflS day of \JB\}W*{«*< 
WALLACE A. LEE, Judgi 
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H 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dee HENSHAW, Barbara Henshaw, and Dana 
Henshaw, Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
v. 
ESTATE OF Jack KING and Bonnie King, Defend-
ants and Appellees. 
No.20061175-CA. 
Nov. 23, 2007. 
Background: Homeowner brought action against 
neighboring property owners, alleging breach of 
contract, tortious interference, breach of the coven-
ant of good faith and fair dealing, theft or conver-
sion, harassment, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, after owners placed gate valve on 
waterline that prevented homeowner from obtaining 
water from creek. Owners filed counterclaim seek-
ing to quiet title in disputed water rights. At the 
close of homeowner's evidence, owners moved for 
directed verdict. The Sixth District Court, Loa De-
partment, Wallace A. Lee, J., granted motion in 
part, entered judgment on jury verdict finding that 
homeowner failed to establish that he was entitled 
to water from creek, and that title to water rights 
should not be quieted in owners, and, thereafter, 
denied homeowner's motion for relief from judg-
ment. Homeowner appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held 
that: 
(1) homeowner's motion to alter or amend judgment 
did not extend period for filing notice of appeal; 
(2) trial court's signing of proposed judgment and 
order prior to expiration of five-day period for 
homeowner to object did not violate rule governing 
procedure for service and filing of proposed orders; 
(3) homeowner was not entitled to relief from judg-
ment based on alleged failure to receive notice of 
entry of judgment; and 
(4) owners were not entitled to attorney fees under 
rule providing for such fees for frivolous appeals. 
Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, J., concurred in part, and con-
curred in result in part. 
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*878 Charles A. Schultz, Brigham City, for Appel-
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Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., McHUGH, 
and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
McHUGH, Judge: 
K 1 Plaintiff Dee Henshaw ™ appeals the *879 
trial court's grant of Defendants Jack FN2 and Bon-
nie King's motion for directed verdict and the trial 
court's denial of Henshaw's motion brought under 
rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We 
affirm. 
FN1. The complaint also lists Barbara 
Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs 
in the action. The trial court subsequently 
concluded, however, that Barbara and 
Dana Henshaw did not have any claims 
against the Kings. Neither Barbara nor 
Dana appealed that ruling. Consequently, 
we reference only Dee Henshaw as the 
plaintiff in this appeal. 
FN2. Jack King died while this appeal was 
pending, and therefore the Estate of Jack 
King is Bonnie King's codefendant on ap-
peal. As a convenience to the reader, we 
refer to Defendants collectively as the Kings. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 The Kings own real property in Wayne County, 
Utah, which includes certain water rights for irriga-
tion from a nearby waterway known as Pine Creek. 
Several years ago, the Kings sold a portion of their 
water rights to their neighbors, Raymond and Mil-
dred Watrous. These rights were conveyed in a wa-
ter deed. In July 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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the Watrouses' home and moved onto the property. 
Barbara Henshaw used the water rights just as the 
Watrouses had, and without any problem, for ap-
proximately eight years. Barbara conveyed her 
home to her son, Dee Henshaw, in August 2003. 
1f 3 The current dispute over the water rights began 
in 2000 when, according to the Kings, Dee Hen-
shaw began using more water than was originally 
allocated to the Watrouses. Eventually, the Kings 
placed a gate valve on the waterline and prevented 
Henshaw from obtaining water from Pine Creek. As 
a result, Henshaw filed the present action alleging 
breach of contract, tortious interference, breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, theft or 
conversion, harassment,FN3 and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The Kings filed an an-
swer, which alleged that Henshaw had no water 
rights, and a counterclaim asking the trial court to 
quiet title in the disputed water rights to the Kings. 
FN3. Henshaw dropped the harassment 
claim in an amended complaint. 
1f 4 The case proceeded to trial, which occurred 
from April 17 to April 20, 2006. At the close of 
Henshaw's evidence, the Kings moved for a direc-
ted verdict. Ruling from the bench, the trial court 
granted the motion in part, dismissing with preju-
dice Henshaw's claims of tortious interference, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of 
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The court also held that Henshaw 
had no cause of action against the Kings for theft or 
conversion. The trial court then "directed] a ver-
dict adjudging that [Henshaw] acquired no right, 
title or interest of Raymond Watrous to Pine Creek 
water or to an easement [on the Kings' land]" be-
cause "the evidence failed to show" that Henshaw 
acquired such rights through Raymond Watrous. 
f 5 At the close of the Kings' evidence, Henshaw 
also filed a motion for directed verdict, which the 
trial court denied. Again ruling from the bench, the 
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trial court determined that Henshaw would be able 
to present to the jury his claims that he is entitled to 
use water from Pine Creek, that he has an easement 
to connect a three-inch waterline to the Kings' six-
inch waterline, and that the Kings' claim to quiet 
title to the water rights should be denied.FN4 
FN4. It is unclear from the trial court's or-
der on the motions for directed verdict 
whether Henshaw's claim to an easement 
and water rights presented to the jury was 
independent of the Raymond Watrous in-
terest, and the trial court's ruling from the 
bench is not part of the record on appeal. 
K 6 On April 20, 2006, the jury returned a verdict 
which determined that Henshaw had failed to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 
entitled to use water from Pine Creek and that he 
had an easement to connect his waterline to the 
Kings' waterline. The jury also determined that title 
to the disputed Pine Creek water rights should not 
be quieted in the Kings. 
H 7 The trial court directed the Kings to prepare the 
proposed judgment and order on the motions for 
directed verdict. The Kings mailed copies of the 
proposed judgment and order to Henshaw on May 
4, 2006. Henshaw filed objections to them, which 
were signed by counsel for Henshaw on May 15. 
2006, but were not filed with the trial court until 
May *880 18, 2006. The Kings responded to Hen-
shaw's objections by filing a reply memorandum on 
May 22, 2006. Prior to receiving Henshaw's objec-
tions, the trial court signed the proposed judgment 
and order on May 15, 2006. 
K 8 After trial but before the filing of the proposed 
judgment and order, the Kings filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. In an order 
signed on June 15, 2006, the trial court denied the 
Kings' motion. In the same order, the trial court 
denied Henshaw's objections to the proposed judg-
ment and order as untimely, but also stated that the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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proposed judgment and order "accurately re-
flect[ed] the [cjourt's ruling on the Motions for Dir-
ected Verdict, as well as the Verdict rendered by 
the Jury." 
K 9 On June 27, 2006, Henshaw filed a Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Judgment, which the trial court 
construed as a motion brought under rule 59(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.FN5 In an order 
filed on September 13, 2006., the trial court denied 
Henshaw's motion as untimely "because it was 
served more than a month after the entry of the Or-
der on Motions for Directed Verdict and the Judg-
ment." See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (stating that u[a] 
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of judg-
ment"). 
FN5. Neither the motion nor the memor-
andum in support of it cited any rule as its 
basis. 
H 10 Henshaw then filed a "Motion for Relief Pur-
suant to Rule 60(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure]" on September 28, 2006. In the motion's 
supporting memorandum, Henshaw asserted that 
the trial court had violated rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. R. 7(f)(2), as well 
as Henshaw's rights to due process and equal pro-
tection of the law. The trial court issued a memor-
andum decision and order denying Henshaw's 60(b) 
motion on November 15, 2006. 
\ 11 On December 15, 2006, Henshaw filed a no-
tice of appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] \ 12 Henshaw contends that the trial court 
erred by granting the Kings' motion for directed 
verdict. " '[I]n reviewing a grant of a directed ver-
dict, we view all facts and the inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. We reverse a directed verdict when 
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the evidence [so viewed] is sufficient to permit a 
reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.' " Gil-
bert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, \ 14, 981 P.2d 841 
(citation omitted) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 
1260, 1261, 1263 (Utah 1993)). 
[3] f 13 Henshaw also challenges the trial court's 
denial of his motion for relief brought under rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. " 'A tri-
al court has discretion in determining whether a 
movant has shown [Rule 60(b) g rounds], and this 
Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when 
there has been an abuse of discretion.' " Lange v. 
Eby, 2006 UT App 118, % 6, 133 P.3d 451 
(alteration in original) (quoting Franklin Covey Cli-
ent Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, \ 9, 2 
P.3d451). 
U 14 Finally, the Kings argue that they are entitled 
to their attorney fees on appeal under rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. SeeVtdh 
R.App. P. 33(a) ("[I]f the court determines that a[n] 
... appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous 
or for delay, it shall award just damages ... and/or 
reasonable attorney fees...."). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Directed Verdict 
[4] If 15 Henshaw's first claim on appeal is that the 
trial court erred by granting the Kings' motion for 
directed verdict. In its May 15, 2006 order on the 
motions for directed verdict, the trial court ruled 
that Henshaw failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he was entitled through Ray-
mond Watrous to use water from Pine Creek and 
that he had an easement to connect his waterline to 
the Kings' waterline for the purposes of irrigating 
his property. The Kings argue that we lack jurisdic-
tion to consider Henshaw's argument. We agree and 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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hold that Henshaw's notice of appeal was untimely 
with respect to his challenge to the directed verdict. 
*881 f 16 According to rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, "the notice of appeal ... 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from." Id R. 4(a). Certain motions, 
however, do toll the period in which a litigant must 
file his notice of appeal. See id. R. 4(b)(1). Included 
in the list of motions that toll the period for filing a 
notice of appeal is "a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure."/</. R. 4(b)(1)(C). 
t 17Rule 4(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, however, requires that a rule 59 motion 
be timely in order to extend the period in which a 
litigant must file a notice of appeal. See id. R. 
4(b)(1) (stating that "[i]f a party timely files in the 
trial court any of the [enumerated] motions, the 
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment 
runs from the entry of the order disposing of the 
motion" (emphasis added)); see also Nielson v. 
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct.App.1994) 
(stating that motion must be timely in order to ex-
tend period in which to file notice of appeal). Here, 
the trial court entered the judgment and order on 
the motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006. 
Henshaw filed his Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Judgment on June 27, 2006.FN6 In a September 13, 
2006 order, the trial court ruled that Henshaw's rule 
59 motion was untimely because such a motion 
must be served within ten days of the entry of the 
order appealed. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 59(e) ("A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judg-
ment."). Thus, because Henshaw's rule 59(e) mo-
tion was untimely, the period for filing a notice of 
appeal was not extended. 
FN6. The motion and memorandum were 
signed on June 23, 2006, but not filed until 
June 27, 2006. 
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If 18 Henshaw had thirty days in which to file an 
appeal from the trial court's order on the motions 
for directed verdict. SeeVtah R.App. P. 4(a). The 
trial court entered the judgment and order on May 
15, 2006. To be valid, the notice of appeal needed 
to be filed by June 14, 2006. Henshaw, however, 
did not file his notice of appeal until December 15, 
2006. As such, it was untimely. See id. 
[5] [6] Tf 19"If an appeal is not timely filed, this 
court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato 
v. Utah Transit Auth, 2000 UT App 299, 1f 7, 13 
P.3d 616; see also Nielson, 888 P.2d at 132 ("[W]e 
cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. In 
fact, *[w]hen a matter is outside the court's jurisdic-
tion it retains only the authority to dismiss the ac-
tion.' " (citation omitted) (second alteration in ori-
ginal) (quoting Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreanx, 
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989))); 
Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 616 
P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984) ("It is axiomatic in this 
jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal 
is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the 
appeal."). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review 
Henshaw's challenge to the trial court's order on the 
motions for directed verdict and dismiss the appeal 
from that order. 
II. Rule 60(b) Motion 
[7] \ 20 Henshaw's second argument is that the trial 
court erred by denying his motion under rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, seeUtah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b). "[W]hen an order on a Rule 60(b) 
motion is appealable, the appeal is narrow in scope 
.... [and] addresses only the propriety of the denial 
or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in 
most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judg-
ment from which relief was sought." Franklin 
Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 
110, If 19, 2 P.3d 451 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
1f 21 Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure states that under specifically enumerated cir-
cumstances, a trial court may "relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The trial court 
construed Henshaw's motion as a request for relief 
under subsection (6) of rule 60(b), which allows a 
court to grant relief for "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." Id. R. 
60(b)(6). 
| 22 Henshaw advances two main arguments in 
support of his claim that the trial court erred by 
denying his 60(b) motion. *882 First, he asserts that 
the trial court should have granted his 60(b) motion 
on the grounds that the court violated rule 7(f)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. R. 
7(f)(2), by signing the proposed judgment and order 
on the motions for directed verdict prior to the ex-
piration of Henshaw's time to object. Second, Hen-
shaw challenges the trial court's conclusion that 
Henshaw was not diligent in determining whether 
the court had signed the proposed judgment and or-
der. We discuss each argument in turn. 
A. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced- ure 
[8] f 23Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure governs the procedure for service and filing 
of proposed orders and objections thereto, and states: 
Unless the court approves the proposed order sub-
mitted with an initial memorandum, or unless 
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's 
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed 
order in conformity with the court's decision. Ob-
jections to the proposed order shall be filed with-
in five days after service. The party preparing the 
order shall file the proposed order upon being 
served with an objection or upon expiration of 
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the time to object. 
Id. (emphasis added). Henshaw contends that the 
trial court signed the proposed judgment and order 
on the motions for directed verdict prior to the ex-
piration of his five-day period to object. According 
to Henshaw, such conduct violated rule 7(f)(2) and 
warranted relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. We disagree. 
[9] \ 24 In order to succeed, Henshaw must show 
that the trial court exceeded its discretion by deny-
ing his rule 60(b) motion. See Lange v. Eby, 2006 
UT App 118, H 6, 133 P.3d 451. The trial court 
signed the proposed judgment and order on 
Monday, May 15, 2006. According to Henshaw, the 
court could not sign the order until Tuesday, May 
16, because Monday, May 15, was the last day in 
which to file an objection. Even assuming, without 
deciding, that Henshaw has properly calculated the 
date by which his objection was due, we are not 
convinced that the trial court erred by signing the 
proposed order on May 15, 2006. 
[10] \ 25 First, nothing in rule 7(f) requires the trial 
court to wait for the expiration of a party's objec-
tion period prior to signing a proposed judgment or 
order. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) ("The party pre-
paring the order shall file the proposed order upon 
being served with an objection or upon expiration 
of the time to object."(emphasis added)). To the 
contrary, Utah case law indicates that the rules per-
taining to the entry of proposed judgments and or-
ders are binding only on the litigants and not on the 
trial court. In Tolboe Construction Co. v. Staker 
Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that the rule 
governing the signing of proposed orders was 
"binding only upon counsel, not upon the trial 
court." Id. at 849. In Tolboe, the appellant claimed 
the trial court erred by signing proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law prior to the expiration 
of the objection period. See id. at 848. The rule at 
issue was rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of 
Utah^see id, which contained similar language 
to current rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.™8 CompareUtah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), 
with Utah R. Practice 2.9(b) (1986) (repealed 
1988). *883 The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
trial court did not violate rule 2.9 because the rule 
did not govern the actions of the court. See Tolboe, 
682 P.2d at 849; see also Hoagland v. Hoagland, 
852 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
(upholding challenged order because "the fact that 
the judge may have signed the recommend[ed or-
der] within the ten-day objection period does not 
nullify the order, nor does it close off the objection 
period"). Although Tolboe is not directly con-
trolling of the instant case, we nonetheless find it 
persuasive and conclude that the trial court did not 
violate rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure because that rule places no restrictions on 
when a trial court may sign a proposed judgment or 
order. 
FN7. Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in 
the District Courts and Circuit Courts of 
the State of Utah stated: "Copies of the 
proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Or-
ders shall be served on opposing counsel 
before being presented to the court for sig-
nature unless the court otherwise orders. 
Notice of objections thereto shall be sub-
mitted to the court and counsel within (5) 
days after service." Utah R. Practice 2.9(b) 
(1986) (repealed 1988). 
FN8. Indeed, rule 2.9 of the Rules of Prac-
tice is the predecessor to rule 7(f)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, .seeUtah R. 
Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Rule 2.9 was superseded by 
rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, see Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
4-504(2) (2002) (repealed 2003), which 
contained similar language. See Utah R. 
Practice 2.9(b) (Supp.1988). Rule 4-504(2) 
was then repealed and its substance was 
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added to rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 2003. See Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 4-501 to -509 (2004). 
f 26 Further, we fail to see how the trial court's 
signing of the proposed judgment and order preju-
diced Henshaw. Cf. Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 849 
(determining that party was not prejudiced by trial 
court's signing of proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prior to expiration of objection 
period). The trial court ruled in its June 19, 2006 
order that Henshaw's objections were untimely. 
Nonetheless, in that same order the court addressed 
the merits of Henshaw's untimely objections and 
stated that the proposed order and judgment 
"accurately reflected] the [cjourt's ruling on the 
Motions for Directed Verdict, as well as the Verdict 
rendered by the Jury ."Thus, Henshaw has not 
shown how the alleged violation of rule 7(f)(2) pre-
judiced him in any way, and we reject Henshaw's 
claim that he is entitled to relief because the trial 
court violated that rule.FN9 
FN9. Henshaw also argues that the trial 
court violated his right to due process. We 
disagree. As discussed above, the trial 
court did not violate any rules applicable to 
it. Furthermore, despite its belief that the 
objections were untimely, the trial court 
considered but rejected Henshaw's sub-
stantive challenge to the proposed order. 
Consequently, Henshaw was heard on this 
point. See Utah County v. hie, 2006 UT 
33, f 22, 137 P.3d 797 ("The hallmarks of 
due process are notice and an opportunity 
to be heard, but not all proceedings de-
mand the same level of process."). 
B. Lack of Diligence 
[11] f 27 Henshaw next contends that the trial court 
erred when it denied his rule 60(b) motion on the 
grounds that Henshaw was not diligent enough in 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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determining whether the trial court entered its judg-
ment on May 15, 2006. Specifically, Henshaw as-
serts that "there was no reason for either Mr. Hen-
shaw or his attorney to assume that the trial court 
had signed and entered [the proposed judgment and 
order]." Henshaw also states that the Kings deliber-
ately misled him into believing the trial court had 
not signed the proposed judgment and order by re-
sponding to his objections. We hold that the trial 
court did not exceed its discretion in denying Hen-
shaw's 60(b) motion. 
\ 28 In Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
2003 UT App 46, 68 P.3d 1008, we explained that 
in order to obtain relief under rule 60(b)(6) based 
on a claim of failure to receive notice of the entry 
of judgment, "the moving party must ... show[ ] di-
ligence in trying to determine whether judgment 
had been entered or have been actually misled ... as 
to whether there had been entry of judgment." Id. f 
9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second omis-
sion in original). In Oseguera, the trial court had 
entered a judgment sua sponte and without notify-
ing the parties. See id. \ 4. As a result, Oseguera, 
the losing party, missed the deadline for filing a no-
tice of appeal and filed a rule 60(b)(6) motion. See 
id. 1fl[ 5-6. The trial court denied Oseguera's motion. 
See id. \ 6. We reversed on the grounds that the tri-
al court "actually misled" Oseguera by setting a 
scheduling conference and oral argument for the 
same date the order was executed. See id. \ 11. Fur-
thermore, because Oseguera had requested judg-
ment in her favor and Farmers; Insurance had not re-
quested judgment, "Oseguera had no reason to be-
lieve such a judgment [in favor of Farmers Insur-
ance] could be forthcoming." Id. 
\ 29 Here, on the other hand, Henshaw received 
timely notice of the proposed judgment and order 
on the motions for directed verdict. Henshaw also 
knew that he had only five dziys in which to object. 
Thus, Henshaw cannot claim that he was unaware 
that the trial court might soon enter a judgment and 
order. Furthermore, the record does not contain any 
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evidence that the trial court, or the Kings, misled 
Henshaw in any way. The mere filing of a response 
to Henshaw's*884 objection does not demonstrate 
any bad faith on the part of the Kings. Indeed, the 
trial court specifically found that there was no evid-
ence to support the allegations that the Kings had 
intentionally misled Henshaw.FN1° 
FN 10. On appeal, Henshaw has not chal-
lenged that finding. 
[12][13] f 30 Although the present case is clearly 
distinguishable from the facts in Oseguera, we reaf-
firm the generally accepted rule that the moving 
parties in a 60(b)(6) motion asserting that they had 
no notice of the trial court's judgment must show 
either "diligence in trying to determine whether 
judgment had been entered," or that they were 
"actually misled ... as to whether there had been 
entry of judgment." Id. \ 9 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original). Further-
more, "[o]ur rules ... put the burden on counsel to 
check periodically with the clerk of the court as to 
the date of entry of the findings and judgment so 
that post-trial motions may be timely filed." Auto-
matic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 
P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1989) (holding that trial 
court did not err by failing to notify counsel 
promptly after signing findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and judgment); see also West v. Grand 
County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). Because 
Henshaw failed to make such a showing, we con-
clude that the trial court did not exceed its discre-
tion by denying Henshaw's rule 60(b) motion. 
III. Attorney Fees 
[14][15] If 31 Finally, the Kings assert that they are 
entitled to attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure because Henshaw's 
appeal is frivolous. We disagree. An appeal is 
frivolous if it "is not grounded in fact, not warran-
ted by existing law, or not based on a good faith ar-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
Page 11 
gument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
Utah R.App. P. 33(b); see also O'Brien v. Rush, 744 
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ("A frivolous 
appeal is one without merit."). Because Henshaw's 
challenge to the denial of his 60(b) motion was not 
wholly without merit, we deny the Kings' request 
for attorney fees.FNn 
FN11. In a single sentence at the end of 
each of his briefs on appeal, Henshaw asks 
for attorney fees on the grounds that he 
prevailed on the Kings' quiet title claim 
and that the Kings violated rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, seeUtah R. 
Civ. P. 11. We decline to address this issue 
because it is inadequately briefed. SeeUtah 
R.App. P. 24(a)(9); Spencer v. Pleasant 
View' City, 2003 UT App 379, \ 20, 80 
P.3d 546 ("Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) re-
quires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority."(internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
CONCLUSION 
If 32 We lack jurisdiction to consider Henshaw's ap-
peal of the directed verdict because Henshaw's no-
tice of appeal was untimely. The trial court did not 
exceed its discretion by denying Henshaw's motion 
brought under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Kings are not entitled to attorney 
fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
133 Affirmed. 
H 34 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
f 35 I CONCUR, EXCEPT THAT AS TO PART 
II.A, I CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT: 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
Utah App.,2007. 
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THE ESTATE OF JACK KING and 
BONNIE KING, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 000600007 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
The following motions are pending in this case: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate filed on 
6 February 2008; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum filed on 5 
March 2008; (3) Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions filed on 20 March 2008; and (4) 
Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum filed on 27 May 2008. 
All these motions, except for the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, have been fully briefed 
and are now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File 
Reply Memorandum should be granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions should not 
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be considered at this time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should be 
granted. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum and Motion to File Overlength 
Memorandum: 
The plaintiffs requested additional time to file a Reply Memorandum in support of their 
Motion to Vacate. The plaintiflFs sought additional time in order to obtain a transcript of the trial. 
However, the plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum on 27 May 2008, which was 
approximately three months late. The plaintiffs did not obtain the transcript and did not file it in 
support of their Reply. 
Nevertheless, the Court is willing to consider the plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
conjunction with its mling on the plaintiffs Motion to Vacate. To this extent, the plaintiflFs' 
Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum should be granted. 
Similarly, the Court finds the plaintiffs adequately explained their need to file an 
overlength memorandum in reply to the defendant's opposition to the plaintiffs Motion to 
Vacate. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should also be 
granted. 
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B. Motion to Vacate: 
The plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is based on Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Motion seeks a ruling voiding a portion of the directed verdict entered on 15 
May 2006 against the plaintiffs. The basis advanced in support of this motion is that the 
defendants did not have standing to argue that the water right in this case did not pass from 
Raymond Waltrous to his wife. 
A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a reasonable time. In this case, the 
plaintiffs' current Motion was filed approximately 21 months after entry of the directed verdict, 
after decision on other post-trial motions, and following an appeal. The Court concludes the 
Motion is simply not timely because it was not filed within a reasonable time. 
There can be no legitimate claim that standing is a new issue. Both parties agree the 
plaintiffs argued the issue of standing at the time of trial. The plaintiffs also raised standing in 
their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed on 23 June 2006. The issue was again raised in 
the plaintiffs' appellate brief filed sometime in December of 2006. However, the plaintiffs 
waited until 6 February 2008 to bring this Motion to Vacate based on lack of standing. 
The Court finds the plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue unreasonable. Thus, the 
plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied as untimely. 
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C. Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions: 
The defendants filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 20 March 2008. The Certificate 
of Mailing shows this Motion and the supporting memorandum were mailed to the plaintiffs' 
attorney. The plaintiffs did not respond to this Motion, and the defendants filed a Request to 
Submit for decision on 23 May 2008. 
On 27 May 2008, the plaintiffs filed an Objection to Defendants' Request to Submit. In 
the Objection, the plaintiffs stated they had never received the defendants' Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions. To date, the plaintiffs have still not filed a response to Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. 
The Court is willing to give the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they did not receive 
the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Thus, it is premature to rule on this Motion. 
The Motion and supporting memorandum are attached to this decision for the plaintiffs' 
reference. The parties are directed to follow the briefing schedule in Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Either party may file a new request to submit for decision when the Motion is fully 
briefed. 
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply 
Memorandum is granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is not considered^ 
time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum is granted. 
DATED this 18 July 2008. 
Wallace A Lee 
Digitally signed by Wallace A Lee 
DN: cn=Wallace A Lee, c=US, o=TrustlD personal 
certificate, ou=Utah, email=wlee@email.utcourts.gov 
Reason: I am approving this document 
Date: 2008.07.18 12:33:10 - 0 6 W 
WALLACE A. LEE, Judge 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Rodney A. VESSEY II, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20030823-CA. 
Dec. 22, 2005. 
Fifth District, St. George Department, 020500141. 
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham. 
Rodney A. Vessey II, Hurricane, Appellant pro se. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
THORNE, J. 
*1 Rodney A. Vessey II appeals from an order 
denying his post-conviction relief petition. We af-
firm. 
Vessey was originally convicted of one count of 
rape of a child. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1 
(2003). Having exhausted multiple claims on direct 
appeal,™1 Vessey filed a post-conviction relief 
petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, denial of due process, and newly dis-
covered evidence. The post-conviction court gran-
ted summary judgment in favor of the State on Ves-
sey's first two claims, but ordered an evidentiary 
hearing on the newly discovered evidence conten-
tion, relying upon affidavits filed by the victim pur-
porting to recant her previous trial testimony. After 
conducting a hearing, the court found that the vic-
tim's recantation was not credible and that Vessey 
failed to satisfy the standard for obtaining relief on 
a claim of newly discovered evidence. SeeUtah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(e) (2002). 
FNlSee State v. Vessey, 2000 UT App 220 
(mem.) (Vessey 2 ); State v. Vessey, 967 
P.2d 960 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (Vessey 1 ); 
State v. Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998). 
Vessey now appeals to this court, arguing that the 
post-conviction court erred in refusing to grant his 
petition for relief. "In deciding habeas appeals, we 
review conclusions of law for correctness, accord-
ing 'no deference to the lower court's conclusions." 
' Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) 
(citation omitted). 
Vessey first claims that the post-conviction court 
erred when it denied his claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. We disagree. A person is not eli-
gible for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act (PCRA), seeUtah Code Ann. §§ 78-3 5a-101 to 
-304 (2002), upon any ground that "was raised or 
addressed at trial or on appeal."/*/. § 
78-35a-106(l)(b)."This rule applies to all claims, 
including constitutional questions." Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 7, \ 5, 43 P.3d 467. 
In Vessey 2, this court reiterated that 
in Vesseyf 1], we concluded that facts on the record 
did not support Defendant's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, and that Defendant failed to 
"allege[ ] specific facts outside the record to sup-
port his claim.'Thus Defendant's claim was adju-
dicated in Defendant's first appeal to this court, and 
Defendant is not entitled to relitigate the issue on 
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this second appeal. 
State v. Vessey, 2000 UT App 220 (mem.) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). Because 
Vessey's ineffective assistance of counsel claim has 
already been addressed by this court, the post-
conviction court correctly determined that this 
claim was procedurally barred.FmSee Pascnal v. 
Carver, 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994) (explaining 
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can-
not be asserted in petition for habeas corpus where 
the claims either could have been raised on direct 
appeal, or were fully and fairly adjudicated on dir-
ect appeal). 
FN2. Vessey also argues that his ineffect-
ive assistance claim may avoid this proced-
ural bar based on an exception to the law 
of the case doctrine. The law of the case 
doctrine provides that "when a legal de-
cision is made on an issue during one stage 
of a case, that decision is binding in suc-
cessive stages of the same litigation." 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1 
67, 82 P.3d 1076 (alteration omitted) 
(citations and quotations omitted). An ex-
ception to the doctrine allows a judge to 
fix mistakes and reconsider prior rulings in 
the same case before a final decision has 
been entered. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310-11 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). The doctrine is inapplicable 
to this case because a final decision has 
already been entered. 
The law of the case doctrine recognizes 
that it may be proper to review an issue 
previously decided by a co-equal court 
when the matter is presented in a 
"different light" or under "different cir-
cumstances," as Vessey now claims. 
State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 n. 2 
(Utah Ct.App.1993) (quotations omit-
ted). Here, again, the law of the case 
doctrine is inapplicable because the post-
conviction court was not reviewing a de-
cision of a co-equal court, but was fol-
lowing the express ruling of this court 
that Vessey was not entitled to relitigate 
his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Vessey also claims that the post-conviction court 
abused its discretion by not allowing Vessey to 
present evidence of an alleged violation of the ex-
clusionary order at his trial. Vessey raised this issue 
on his direct appeal and this court refused to ad-
dress the issue, stating that "defendant failed to ob-
ject to these alleged errors during the trial and has 
not demonstrated on appeal that they were plain er-
ror." State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998). As with Vessey's claim of ineffect-
ive assistance of counsel, his claimed error regard-
ing the exclusionary order had already been decided 
on direct appeal, and therefore was procedurally 
barred. See Pascual, 876 P.2d at 366. 
*2 Finally, Vessey argues that he is entitled to re-
lief on a claim of newly discovered evidence based 
on four affidavits filed by the victim, allegedly re-
canting her prior trial testimony. Vessey's only ar-
gument for relief under the newly discovered evid-
ence prong of the PCRA was that "viewed with all 
the other evidence, the newly discovered material 
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of 
fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the of-
fense or subject to the sentence received."Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(e)(iv). The post-
conviction court held a hearing on Vessey's claims 
relating to the credibility of the affidavits and re-
cantation, and determined that the victim's affi-
davits and evidentiary hearing testimony were not 
credible and that "substantial evidence contradicts, 
refutes, or otherwise casts doubt on [the victim's] 
affidavits and evidentiary hearing testimony ." 
We see no error in the post-conviction court's de-
termination. Given the overwhelming amount of 
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evidence pointing towards Vessey's guilt, particu-
larly in light of the post-conviction court's finding 
concerning the credibility of the victim's recanta-
tion, it is impossible to say that the affidavits 
demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have found Vessey guilty of the offense. Significant 
evidence was presented at the post-conviction hear-
ing that refuted the victim's affidavits and eviden-
tiary hearing testimony. Further, testimony at the 
hearing corroborated the victim's earlier trial testi-
mony and allegations. Based on these findings, the 
affidavits do not warrant a new trial and Vessey's 
post-conviction relief petition was properly denied. 
See State v. Hofftiine, 2001 UT 4, \ 28, 20 P.3d 265 
(holding that victim's recantation was not sufficient 
as new evidence to warrant a new trial); State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 18, 994 P.2d 1237 (holding 
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing a motion for new trial based on a letter written 
by the victim which allegedly recanted her trial 
testimony). Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding 
Judge, GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
Utah App.,2005. 
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